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Amanda Marziliano, Rutgers University-New Brunswick 
My larger research project focuses on the question of how the European Union has achieved so 
much integration without a concurrent increase in identification. Most scholarship to date 
focuses on affective identity, and upon observing the lack of change or increase in decades, 
predicts a dire future for the European Union, which cannot move forward without creating some 
type of European citizen (Duchesne and Frognier 1995). I hypothesize that the European Union 
has actually become politically legitimate, even though its citizens do not express affective 
identification with the European Union. The literature shows that the public has awareness of 
positive externalities and the benefits of cost-sharing (Milner and Tingley 2012, Eichenberg 
2005, Timmons 2005, Bartels 2002, Kinder, and Kiewiet 1979). Thus, they can reasonably make 
decisions about the policies they want controlled by the supranational level. This paper uses a 
between-subjects survey experiment with British and Irish citizens to focus on priming subjects 
to think about either national or supranational concerns. Prompts will lead them to consider 
efficiencies of cost or loss of sovereignty in two policy areas. The survey will then ask whether 
they think the EU or national governments should handle that policy area. If my hypothesis is 
correct, considering the efficiencies of cost-sharing should make respondents more likely to 
support European governance in a particular policy area than they would be without such 
framing. Identification simply cannot explain the puzzle of such significant advancements in 
integration—but legitimacy and tolerance can. Examining how many feel European, or identify 
with the EU on an emotional level, will explain the success of recent decades. Basing pessimistic 
predictions about the EU’s future on the disappointing results of such calculations about 
affective identification is therefore not borne out by the data on legitimacy. As Ernst Haas and 
Karl Deutsch both emphasize, loyalty to the EU will come as a byproduct of more pragmatic and 
instrumental actions (Haas 1964, Haas 1968, Deutsch 1957).  
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Over the last several decades, the European Union has made unprecedented advances in 
integration, giving it a great deal more power and scope. It has taken over several areas of policy 
traditionally confined to the national government. To scholars, however, the future of the 
European project has seemed in jeopardy, due to an apparent stagnation of identity. According to 
Duchesne and Frognier, identification with Europe did not increase significantly in three decades 
between the 1960s and 1990s, despite drastic changes throughout this period
1
. Traditionally, 
scholars have seen such an affective identity as necessary for continued integration. My larger 
project will focus on how one can reconcile this disparity—through utilizing the concept of 
tolerance of European governance. I argue that through creating more shared projects and 
functionality, European citizens grow to accept EU governance at a greater level. EU citizens 
recognize the burden-sharing and positive externalities that result from transferring certain public 
policies to the supranational levels. This tolerance transforms citizens’ identification and allows 
them to become European, although their affective identity may not change. In this project, I 
show that public opinion data finds little evidence for the crisis of legitimacy many attribute to 
the European Union. Over time, support for having certain policies at the European level has 
actually grown, despite a lack of increase in identification. 
In this project, tolerance will be defined as acceptance of the power transfer from the 
national to the supranational entity—at minimum, acceptance, and maximum, a preference for 
the supranational entity. Legitimacy will be defined as government which the citizens find 
deserving of support because it satisfies basic needs efficiently and effectively. Tolerance is a 
result of legitimacy—acceptance of the power transfer because citizens find the level of 
government in question to be capable of effectively and efficiently satisfying basic needs. 
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 Sophie Duchesne and Andre-Paul Frognier, “Is There a European Identity?” in Public Opinion and 
Internationalized Governance, eds. Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1995).  
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In this paper, I will present the results of a survey experiment, administered through 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk program. This survey experiment is a pre-test, and the final 
experiment will compose a chapter of my dissertation—one piece of evidence for my theory that 
identification with Europe is based on legitimacy. The survey focuses on framing situational 
questions to prime subjects to think about either national or supranational concerns. I will then 
observe whether the framing affects their responses to questions about policy responsibilities. 
Respondents will receive prompts that emphasize either loss of national sovereignty or potential 
cost efficiencies in two policy areas, the environment and education; there will also be a control 
group that receives neutral factual information about the policy area. The survey will then ask 
whether they think the EU or national governments should handle that policy area. If my 
hypothesis is correct, considering the frames should make respondents more likely to support 
European or national governance, respectively, in a particular policy area than they would be 
without such framing—shifting their opinions based on the rationality of making a certain policy 
supranational or not. This survey will help me show that EU citizens prize rational concerns 
above affective identity when they consider their dual identities. In this era of gloomy 
predictions for the future of Europe, it is important to remember that the European Union was 
founded with the goal of pursuing economic benefits for its members. 
In my larger project, I hypothesize that confusion over who is responsible leads a 
European citizen to consider a comparative analysis between perceived capabilities of the levels 
of government (as described in Schneider et al 2010). In other words, does the citizen currently 
think his national government or the European government is functioning better? This is in turn 
followed by instrumental calculations about which level of government could best and most 
efficiently deal with the policy area. With an appropriate policy area, this chain can lead to 
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tolerance of a power transfer. Eurobarometer data over the past two decades on several policy 
areas shows that supranational control of policies where economies of scale play a role have 
more support than policies that would not benefit from economies of scale. Citizens are aware of 
what policy areas create fiscal efficiency, and take this into account when tolerating power 
transfer. In another chapter of my dissertation, I use Eurobarometer data to isolate more specific 
determinants of support for supranational control. 
Most literature on European identity uses the traditional Eurobarometer survey question 
measuring support for further integration as a measure of European identity, or questions asking 
whether the respondent feels more French than European, or more European than French. This 
often leads to conclusions that European identity is underdeveloped. This project posits that to 
better explain the success of European integration despite the lack of identification, we must look 
to legitimacy. Legitimacy can be truly found in tolerance and acceptance of the supranational 
institution’s control over a policy area traditionally controlled by the national government. A 
European populace will share projects and goals, and thus share costs and benefits alike. This 
creates much more interdependence and identification that is unrelated to trust or support for 
integration. When examined this way, it is clear that European legitimacy is more present than 
many scholars think—it simply needs to be seen from a different perspective. Focusing on 
legitimacy and tolerance of the supranational government explains the increase in integration 
despite a lack of identification. This new look justifies the historic levels of European integration 
over the last few decades without a concurrent increase in European identity as currently 
conceptualized. While there is a role for symbols in the long-term formation of a European 
identity, during this crucial period, the perception of European governance as effective is vital 
for legitimacy and continued growth. 
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Symbolic Politics or Self-Interested Voting? 
Is public opinion based on self-interest? While traditionally, the conflict in this literature 
has been described as whether people vote in a manner that is self-interested or values-based, I 
believe that this does not account for significant variation in the literature. Thus, I will discuss 
scholarship in this field as being divided into three categories: pocketbook, sociotropic, and 
symbolic. Pocketbook voting focuses on the idea that public opinion is shaped based on 
individual self-interest. Sociotropic voting is based on the idea that individual opinion is shaped 
based on collective good as well as individual good. Symbolic politics holds that public opinion 
is not at all shaped by self-interest, but rather is formed by values that are independent of any 
rational concerns, either individual or collective. 
Pocketbook Voting: Self-Interest 
 In this body of literature, individuals vote and form public opinion based on individual 
self-interest. It is generally found in one of two situations: public policy opinions or vote choice. 
Opinions on public policy have often been identified as a situation where individuals support a 
particular policy based on their pocketbook. Self-interest has been shown to have an impact on 
support for the Vietnam War—those less likely to be in immediate danger of the draft were more 
supportive of the war effort.
2
 Another study shows that while typically low-income Americans 
participate less politically, this effect is reversed for low-income seniors; the more dependent 
they are on government programs, the more political participation one can expect.
3
 Self-interest 
has also been shown to play a role in policies that involve racial tensions (school busing), 
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 Daniel E. Bergan, “The Draft Lottery and Attitudes Toward the Vietnam War”, Public Opinion Quarterly 73.2 
(2009): 379-384.  
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 Andrea Louise Campbell, “Self-Interest, Social Security, and the Distinctive Participation Patterns of Senior 
Citizens”, American Political Science Review  96.3 (2002): 565-574.  
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smoking, gun control, and education policy.
4
 Chong et al. assess self-interest in public opinion 
with three different policy areas: social security reform, the home mortgage interest tax 
deduction, and health care benefits for domestic partners. They argue that the important question 
is when self-interest matters, not whether it matters, and that it is more likely to be important in 
policy formation when individuals recognize that they have a stake in a policy. In sum, people 
are more likely to hold public opinion based on self-interest when the implications of a policy are 
clear, or they have been primed to think about their self-interest. 
5
 They do not doubt, however, 
that self-interest plays a very important role in opinion formation. 
 Vote choice plays a role in self-interested politics as well as in public policy. For 
example, income level and economic self-interest has been shown to inform vote choice in New 
Zealand elections
6
. In England, Johnson et al. show that voters punish incumbent parties based 
on local unemployment, even if national economic conditions had improved.
7
 In this body of 
literature, people vote based on the personal impact they foresee. Self-interest therefore not only 
affects opinions but also vote choice. 
Sociotropic Voting 
 In other literature, self-interested voting is certainly a factor, but sociotropic voting also 
plays a role—in other words, people are self-interested on behalf of what is good for their 
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community, rather than solely focusing on what is good for themselves as individuals. For 
example, in terms of vote choice, individuals will focus on state or national economic contexts 
when choosing whether or not to support the incumbent party, rather than just their local 
economic situation
8
. They will even ignore personal economic concerns in favor of larger-scale 
economic measures, or prioritize macroeconomic measures above personal situations.
9
 Many 
social scientists suggest that these forms of sociotropic voting are inspired by the media, or 
created through other sources of public information.
10
 Burden and Mughan show that not only 
does the national economy matter for presidential approval in the United States, but the 
international economy does as well.
11
 They also note, like Chong et al., that self-interest in vote 
choice and attitudes is strongly influenced by framing and priming. Duch and Stevenson show 
that individual voters are sufficiently informed about the economy to make informed choices, in 
line with my argument. 
 Carolyn Funk argues that voters are influenced both by self-interest and societal interest, 
and incorporate both considerations when evaluating public policy proposals. Citizens are more 
willing to sacrifice when that sacrifice involves giving more benefits to others, as opposed to 
cutting off benefits to themselves; but they do have a developed sense of societal interest, and 
will under certain conditions prioritize collective wellbeing over personal wellbeing. Funk 
argues, contrary to several other scholars, that it is not necessary to frame to induce concern for 
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society as a whole.
12
 This idea is also evidenced in work on old age policies, by Huddy et al. 
Support for old age policies is based on compassion, particularly on perceived financial need—
non-elderly respondents who view the elderly as financially needy are more likely to support 
policies to assist them. 
Symbolic Politics 
 Other political scientists argue that vote choice and attitudes are not, in fact, conditioned 
by self-interest or societal interest—but by values that are created early in life and are far more 
stable.
13
 In this vein, Sears argues that survey literature does not find self-interest effects as often 
as does experimental literature, and that self-interest is more temporary and fleeting, while 
values are lasting, due to the differences in which types of studies find certain effects.
14
 Sears 
and Lau write that the influence of self-interest is a result of “item-order artifacts” rather than 
actual attitudes and preferences—merely a result of methodology and survey administration, 
rather than reflecting a stable attitude that can be measured repeatedly.
15
 
Chong and Marshall examine one situation in a small Texas town that created a conflict 
between values and economics, concluding that people find comfort in values because they give 
everyday life a sense of coherence, even when these values seem to go against their material 
interests.
16
 Sears et al. look for self-interest effects on four major public policy issues and find 
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self-interest measures had little effect, but symbolic attitudes such as party identification or racial 
prejudice had much stronger effects on respondents.  
These three bodies of literature differ in many respects, and all are substantially 
supported by excellent scholarship. It is my feeling that the elimination of self-interest as a value 
in its entirety is unwise. Public attitudes and vote choice, in general, can rarely be explained by a 
single factor. Arguments that both self-interest and symbolic attitudes come into play are much 
more persuasive; but I think it is particularly important to emphasize that self-interest and 
recognition of societal interest cannot be ignored. Voters are sufficiently competent to recognize 
self-interest as well as what will serve the common good, and it is this principle on which my 
argument is based.  
Hypotheses 
 I hypothesize that when respondents are primed to consider rational concerns—
economics of scale and efficiencies of cost under supranational policy, or national sovereignty—
they will shift their opinions on whether the national or supranational government should control 
a particular policy area. Europeans consider issues of governance rationally and are capable of 
recognizing the benefits inherent in control by particular levels of government; therefore, they 
should be able to recognize their own interests as presented to them in the experimental prompts. 
Respondents will be provided with one of two frames, one based around national sovereignty 
and one based around the cost efficiency of supranational policy. A control group will receive 
neutral information.  
H1: The control group will reflect population norms from Eurobarometer on whether 
national or supranational government should control the specific policy areas in the 
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prompts.  
H2: The group primed to consider cost efficiency will have a higher proportion of 
respondents who support supranational control.  
H3: The group primed to consider national sovereignty will have a higher proportion of 
respondents who support national control of a policy area. 
Methodology 
The survey questionnaire (see Appendix A) will begin with screening questions to 
determine whether the respondent is an English or Irish citizen. The United Kingdom and Ireland 
will comprise the sample under study, as Mechanical Turk is currently available only in English. 
This would create significantly biased results in non-English speaking countries. Results should 
still be generalizable, however, as the UK is heavily Euro-skeptic and Ireland is traditionally pro-
Europe. Ireland will additionally make an interesting study, as it has been heavily affected by the 
European financial crisis. Respondents will also be asked how long they have lived in the United 
Kingdom or Ireland; those who have lived in the country for less than 5 years will be eliminated 
from the survey. 
The survey will then begin immediately with the experimental questions; respondents 
will be presented with two prompts (either the control, the national sovereignty prompt, or the 
supranational cost efficiency prompt), and then asked after each prompt what level of 
government should control the policy referred to in the text. The issues selected to use in the 
experiment were environmental policy and education policy. These issues were selected because 
they are not highly controversial in current events (unlike defense policy or immigration policy), 
and recent Eurobarometer surveys put support for policy control at each level of government at a 
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point where I could ensure there was little risk of ceiling effects with the treatment.   
After the experiment, standard questions will be asked about the respondent’s attitudes 
and behavior vis-à-vis European politics—whether they voted in the recent European Parliament 
elections, their attitudes toward European Union membership for their country, and their 
opinions on the efficiency and effectiveness of both the European government and their national 
government. The experiment will close with basic demographic questions. These questions will 
allow me to pursue further analysis of other characteristics of those who support European 
governance versus those who support national governance.  
A power analysis assuming a small effect size (f=0.1), alpha=0.05, and power=0.8 for 
four groups has shown that I will need 1096 subjects. For this pre-test, I ended up with 43 
subjects to test my stimulus and hypotheses. The final experiment will include all 1096 subjects. 
In the pre-test, I did not block on national identity, but I plan to do so in the final experiment in 
order to identify specific differences between British and Irish subjects. Two attention checks 
were utilized in the survey to make sure respondents were paying attention.  
Results 
 After removing fraudulent results (which I will discuss in the conclusions section), I 
ended up with 43 respondents in the pre-test. Figure 1 shows a cross-tabulation of all 43 results 
for environmental policy, and Figure 2 shows a cross-tabulation of all 43 results for education 
policy. Figure 3 shows a cross-tabulation of results for respondents who received the 
supranational frame, for environmental policy, Figure 4 shows a cross-tabulation of results for 
respondents who received the national frame, for environmental policy, and Figure 5 shows a 
cross-tabulation of results for respondents who received the control frame, for environmental 
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policy. Figure 6 shows a cross-tabulation of results for respondents who received the 
supranational frame, for education policy, Figure 7 shows a cross-tabulation of results for 
respondents who received the national frame, for education policy, and Figure 8 shows a cross-
tabulation of results for respondents who received the control frame, for education policy.  
Control: Environmental Policy Frequency Percentage 
National 19 44.19 
Joint 17 39.53 
Supranational  7 16.28 
Figure 1 
Control: Education Policy Frequency Percentage 
National 25 58.14 
Joint 13 30.23 
Supranational  5 11.63 
Figure 2 
In both cases, the division of those who support solely national control versus some involvement 
by the European Union is nearly equal. Environmental policy shows a slight bias toward the 
European level of government, while education policy shows a slight bias toward national 
government. While the results for environmental policy are essentially reflective of population 
results in the 2011 Eurobarometer survey, the results for education are substantially more pro-
supranational than the Eurobarometer population. The first hypothesis is thus partially supported.  
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Supranational Frame:  
Control of Environmental Policy 
Frequency Percentage 
National 4 40 
Joint 4 40 
Supranational  2 20 
Total 10 100 
Figure 3 
National Frame: 
Control of Environmental Policy 
Frequency Percentage 
National 5 31.25 
Joint 7 43.75 
Supranational  4 25 
Total 16 100 
Figure 4 
Control Frame: 
Control of Environmental Policy 
Frequency Percentage 
National 10 58.82 
Joint 6 35.29 
Supranational  1 5.88 
Total 17 100 
Figure 5 
These tables show the results for environmental policy. It is clear that the frames did change 
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opinions when compared to the control information. The supranational frame in particular was 
successful. Nearly two-thirds, or 60%, of respondents were willing to tolerate joint or sole EU 
control of environmental policy (as opposed to 40% of respondents in the control group). What is 
unexpected, however, is that a national sovereignty frame appears to have the opposite effect of 
what is expected. The national sovereignty frame also increases support for supranational control 
of environmental policy, and they end up at similar levels. Nearly two-thirds of respondents 
exposed to either frame support supranational control. These results support my second 
hypothesis, but not my third hypothesis.  
Supranational Frame: 
Control of Education Policy 
Frequency Percentage 
National 4 40 
Joint 4 40 
Supranational  2 20 
Total 10 100 
Figure 6 
National Frame: 
Control of Education Policy 
Frequency Percentage 
National 10 55.56 
Joint 7 38.89 
Supranational  1 5.56 
Total 18 100 
Figure 7 
15 
 
Control Frame: 
Control of Education Policy 
Frequency Percentage 
National 11 73.33 
Joint 2 13.33 
Supranational  2 13.33 
Total 15 100 
Figure 8 
These tables show the results for education policy. Here also, it seems that frames did have an 
effect. The supranational frame creates an even larger change, increasing support from about 
one-quarter to 60%. Again, the national frame also seems to increase support for supranational 
governance, although not as much as the supranational frame—up to about 45%. These results 
bear out my second hypothesis, although they do not support the third hypothesis. 
 These heavily pro-supranational results could perhaps be explained by examining other 
overall trends in the data. The respondents in this group seem to overall be more pro-Europe than 
the average respondent. Two-thirds of them believe their country’s membership in the EU is a 
good thing, and similar proportions find the European government both efficient and effective. 
The respondents also skew heavily toward higher levels of education and a younger average age, 
which is consistent with characteristics of Mechanical Turkers. The more educated and the 
young tend to be more supportive of European initiatives. Since this is a small sample, even a 
few respondents can skew the results. But how did having a more pro-European sample cause 
such a result with the national frame? I believe that this is due to cognitive dissonance—when an 
individual is prompted with information that runs counter to their personal attitudes, it 
strengthens their original opinion. I did not account for cognitive dissonance in my original 
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hypotheses. Due to the pro-Europe bias in the sample, cognitive dissonance has shifted the 
results.  
Conclusions 
To sum up, my second hypothesis finds strong support. Opinions changed when 
individuals were presented with a frame forcing them to consider economies of scale on a 
supranational level. The first hypothesis is partially supported. While the sample levels for 
environmental policy reflected population levels, this was not so for education policy. The third 
hypothesis is not strongly supported. I posit that this is due to cognitive dissonance and a skewed 
pro-EU population on Mechanical Turk. I believe, however, that these results are extremely 
important. Supranational framing was shown to shift opinions to be more pro-European as 
opposed to the views of a control group. This is critical evidence toward proving my point. It 
appears from this initial evidence that legitimacy and rationality are important convincing factors 
for Europeans when they consider whether they approve of European governance. Moving 
forward, I expect to see these results reflected in a larger sample. 
While I do feel my initial results partially bear out my hypotheses, there were some 
problems using Mechanical Turk that limit this study’s potential for full application in my 
dissertation research. Despite clearly labeling the study as limited to residents of the United 
Kingdom and Ireland, and using screening questions, examination of IP addresses showed that 
many respondents were actually residents of India who answered the survey questions under 
false pretenses. These results were not used in the final analysis in this paper, which meant that 
there were fewer responses than expected and that the treatments were not quite evenly 
distributed—in both cases, the supranational treatment had fewer responses than either the 
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national treatment or the control. The level of fraud, however, was nearly 50% of the total 
responses. This is concerning when considering the difficulty of finding nearly 1100 subjects 
who actually are European. I am considering other options for the final survey.  
Mechanical Turk has several European counterparts, including Crowdflower and other 
similar websites, but I am not sure how widely used they are and whether they would also allow 
a sufficient sample specifically from the United Kingdom and Ireland. Additionally, a possibility 
is reaching out to the Rutgers University office that deals with international students, and 
inquiring whether they can send the survey to international students attending Rutgers who are of 
European origin. This could also be done at other regional universities if there was not a 
sufficiently large population at Rutgers. Since student samples are generally accepted in the 
scholarly literature, this might be the best way to accomplish a scientific sample that covered 
many EU countries, although it would not be evenly representative of those countries. One 
concern with this method, however, is that response rates could potentially be low and it would 
be difficult to get a full complement of 1100 subjects. My budget for this survey is 
approximately $500, so I am looking for a low-cost way to get results for this experiment.  
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Appendix A: Survey Stimulus 
Dissertation Pre-Test Survey 
 
 
Q1.1 In which country do you currently reside? 
 The United Kingdom (1) 
 Ireland (2) 
 Somewhere else (3) 
If Another country Is Selected, Then Skip To End of Survey 
 
Q1.2 How long have you lived there? 
 0-5 years (1) 
 6-10 years (2) 
 More than 10 years (3) 
If 0-3 years Is Selected, Then Skip To End of Survey 
 
Q2.1 The European Union has been a world leader in environmental policy for many years. Its regulations address 
such pressing issues as acid rain, the ozone layer, air quality, noise pollution, and waste and water pollution. The 
impetus for the creation of EU environmental policy came about because of concerns that different environmental 
standards could lead to trade barriers or competitive distortions in the common market. Additionally, since the 
nations of the EU share rivers, land, and air, pollution in one country can affect others, even if they have stricter 
standards. Because of the common market and the logistics of geography, it makes sense to regulate environmental 
policy at the EU level. 
 
Q2.2 The European Union has some of the most extensive environmental laws of any international 
organization. The Institute for European Environmental Policy estimates the body of EU environmental law amounts 
to well over 500 Directives, Regulations and Decisions, dealing with issues from acid rain to water pollution. These 
extremely high environmental standards are damaging to businesses, particularly those in poorer countries. 
Companies in these countries are less able to afford to abide by the EU's high standards, and it is unfair to expect 
them to be on par with richer nations. Countries in the EU should be able to set their own environmental standards 
based on what is right for their people. 
 
Q2.3 The European Union has some of the most extensive environmental laws of any international 
organization. The Institute for European Environmental Policy estimates the body of EU environmental law amounts 
to well over 500 Directives, Regulations and Decisions, dealing with issues from acid rain to water pollution. The 
October European Council set out a package of targets for Europe’s climate emissions and its energy system up to 
2030. The headline goal featured “at least” a 40% reduction in domestic emissions.. The energy targets included 
commitments to achieve a 27% share for renewable energy, and to deliver a 27% improvement in energy efficiency. 
 
Q2.4 In regards to the policy mentioned above, please tell me whether you would prefer for your national 
government to mostly have control over this area, for your national government and the EU to have joint control, or 
for the EU to mostly have control over this area? 
 Mostly national control (1) 
 Joint control (2) 
 Mostly EU control (3) 
 
Q3.1 The European Union currently supports education policy in member states. Perhaps the best known initiative is 
the Erasmus program, which provides university students with the opportunity to study in other EU member states. 
Currently, academic degree standards and structures are not harmonized throughout the EU. Since citizens can live 
and work in any member state, it would be simpler if the EU had more control over educational policy. It would be 
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clearer to employers what a particular qualification signified, and easier for citizens to find more job opportunities 
throughout the EU. The quality of education throughout the EU is extremely variable. With a harmonized education 
policy, the supranational government would work to increase the quality of higher education across Europe, which 
in turn will augment the competitiveness of European workers in a global economy.  Should the EU have more 
control over primary and secondary education, children would learn the common history of Europe and the 
supranational community, and more information about the EU would be available to the next generation of 
European adults.  
 
Q3.2 The European Union currently plays a supporting role vis-a-vis education policy in member states, with most 
of the power remaining with national governments. This is appropriate, because individual member states have 
different cultures and histories. It should be their responsibility to teach their citizens these cultures and histories, to 
maintain and guard national cultures within the EU. Different member states also have separate systems of testing 
and dividing students to better train them for later life, as well as different training and requirements for teachers. 
Combining these systems, and creating one that can be agreed upon by all parties, will be highly troublesome. 
Parents have the right to be able to seek changes in their child's education within their local area.  It is important to 
maintain member state control over education, as it is a policy area that is highly dependent on one's locality--
scheduling, subject matter, etc. The many differences between member states are simply too vast to bridge. 
 
Q3.3 The European Union currently supports education policy in member states. Perhaps the best known initiative is 
the Erasmus Program. Students who join the Erasmus Program study at least 3 months or do an internship for a 
period of at least 2 months to an academic year in another European country. The Erasmus Program guarantees that 
the period spent abroad is recognized by their university when they come back, as long as they abide by terms 
previously agreed. The Europe 2020 strategy has set a target that by 2020 40% of young Europeans have a higher 
education qualification. National governments are responsible for their education and training systems, however, 
and individual universities organize their own curricula. 
 
Q3.4 In regards to the policy area mentioned above, please tell me whether you would prefer for your national 
government to mostly have control over this area, for your national government and the EU to have joint control, or 
for the EU to mostly have control over this area? 
 Mostly national control (1) 
 Joint control (2) 
 Mostly EU control (3) 
 
AC1 Who is the president of the United States? 
 George W. Bush (1) 
 Barack Obama (2) 
 Mitt Romney (3) 
 
Q4.1 Where do you get most of your news about the European Union? 
 Print newspapers (1) 
 Internet sources (2) 
 Television (3) 
 Radio (4) 
 Do not pay much attention to news about the European Union (5) 
 
Q4.2 Were you aware of the recent European Parliament election? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Q4.3 In what month was the recent European Parliament election held? 
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Q4.4 Were you able to vote in the recent European Parliament election? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
If No Is Selected, Then Skip To End of Block 
 
Q4.5 What party did you vote for? 
 British National Party (1) 
 Conservative (2) 
 Fianna Fail (3) 
 Fine Gael (4) 
 Greens (5) 
 Labour (UK) (6) 
 Liberal Democrat (7) 
 Scottish Nationalist Party (8) 
 Sinn Fein (9) 
 UK Independence Party (10) 
 Prefer not to answer (11) 
 
Q5.1 Overall,  do you think being a member of the EU has been a good thing, a bad thing, or neither a good nor a 
bad thing for your country? 
 A good thing (1) 
 A bad thing (2) 
 Neither good nor bad (3) 
 
Q5.2 Do you see yourself as... 
 Mostly national (i.e. British, Irish) (1) 
 Both, but national more than European (2) 
 Both, but European more than national (3) 
 Mostly European (4) 
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Q5.3 For each policy area listed below, please tell me whether you would prefer your national government to mostly 
have control over this area, for your national government and the EU to have joint control, or for the EU to mostly 
have control over this area? 
 Mostly national control 
(1) 
Joint control (2) Mostly EU control (3) 
Education (1)       
Healthcare (2)       
Social welfare (3)       
Defense (4)       
Foreign policy (5)       
Foreign aid (6)       
Environment (7)       
Immigration and asylum 
(8) 
      
 
 
Q5.4 What color is the Tardis? 
 blue (1) 
 green (2) 
 red (3) 
 orange (4) 
If blue Is Not Selected, Then Skip To End of Survey 
 
Q6.1 Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements.  
 
Q6.2 The European Union governs efficiently. 
 Strongly Agree (1) 
 Somewhat Agree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Somewhat Disagree (4) 
 Strongly Disagree (5) 
 
Q6.3 The European Union governs effectively. 
 Strongly Agree (1) 
 Agree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Disagree (4) 
 Strongly Disagree (5) 
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Q6.4 The European Union is a threat to my country's national sovereignty. 
 Strongly Agree (1) 
 Agree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Disagree (4) 
 Strongly Disagree (5) 
 
Q6.5 My national government governs efficiently. 
 Strongly Agree (1) 
 Agree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Disagree (4) 
 Strongly Disagree (5) 
 
Q6.6 My national government governs effectively. 
 Strongly Agree (1) 
 Agree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Disagree (4) 
 Strongly Disagree (5) 
 
Q7.1 What year were you born? 
 
Q7.2 What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 Less than High School (1) 
 High School / GED (2) 
 Some College (3) 
 2-year College Degree (4) 
 4-year College Degree (5) 
 Masters Degree (6) 
 Doctoral Degree (7) 
 Professional Degree (JD, MD) (8) 
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Q7.3 Please indicate your occupation: 
 Homemaker (1) 
 Student (2) 
 Unemployed (3) 
 Retired/Disabled (4) 
 Farmer/Fisherman (5) 
 Professional (lawyer, medical practitioner, accountant, etc) (6) 
 Owner of a shop, craftsmen, other self-employed (7) 
 Business proprietors, owner of a company (8) 
 General management (9) 
 Employed position, working mainly at a desk (10) 
 Employed position, not a desk but traveling (11) 
 Service job (12) 
 Skilled manual worker (13) 
 Unskilled manual worker (14) 
 
Q7.4 What is your race? 
 White/Caucasian (1) 
 African (2) 
 Hispanic (3) 
 Asian (4) 
 Other (5) 
 
Q7.5 What is your gender? 
 Male (1) 
 Female (2) 
 
Q7.6 What is your combined annual household income in US dollars? 
 under $20,000 (1) 
 20,000-29,999 (2) 
 30,000-39,999 (3) 
 40,000-49,999 (4) 
 50,000-59,999 (5) 
 60,000-69,999 (6) 
 70,000-79,999 (7) 
 80,000-89,999 (8) 
 90,000-99,999 (9) 
 100,000-109,999 (10) 
 110,000-119,999 (11) 
 120,000-129,999 (12) 
 130,000-139,999 (13) 
 140,000-149,999 (14) 
 150,000+ (15) 
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Q7.7 Please indicate your marital status: 
 Single (1) 
 Married (2) 
 Separated (3) 
 Divorced (4) 
 Widowed (5) 
 Never Married (6) 
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